Introduction
Ensuring financial access to health services is one of the most critical challenges poor countries face if they are to reach the health Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Fryatt et al. 2010; The Taskforce 2010) . Many countries are currently amending their health financing policies to reduce financial barriers, particularly for mothers and children (Yates 2009 ). Too often, however, well-intentioned policies have failed at the time of implementation. Madagascar's attempt to introduce free health care in 2002 is a case in point. What followed was a drop in availability of drugs and subsequent reversal of the policy (Fafchamps et al. 2007) .
Few studies have examined the impact of changes at scale in health financing policies of developing countries using survey data and quasi-experimental designs. Many papers present the experience of a small number of facilities, outside the national financing framework. They often draw conclusions using service-based data, relying on imperfect health information systems (Save the Children 2005), which neither account for the effect of reporting incentives linked to particular financing policies, nor for the displacement of utilization from alternative providers. Moreover, these studies rarely measure variations in utilization by income group (Collins et al. 1996; Wilkinson et al. 2001; Burnham et al. 2004) , and they do not adequately show whether changes in utilization are sustained in the long term. Finally, most of them have inadequate designs and the risk of bias is high (Lagarde and Palmer 2008) . More rigorous studies rely on population survey data examining the effect of policies over time (Xu et al. 2006) , while the best studies use quasiexperimental design, nesting an experiment within a national programme, using a control group and survey data (Litvack and Bodart 1993; Diop et al. 1995) .
A particular weakness of most studies is the exclusive focus on measuring aggregated outpatient (OPD) visits at the expense of more granulated measures of financial access to health services. A limited number of studies report the impact of financing strategies on out-of-pocket spending and catastrophic expenditures (Xu et al. 2006; Wagstaff 2007; Wagstaff et al. 2009 ). None, however, examines the impact on quality and utilization of preventive and curative interventions with high effectiveness for the health MDGs, such as assisted deliveries, use of insecticide-treated nets, or rates of treatment of acute respiratory infections among children less than 5 years of age. If we are to learn from cross-country experiences, there is a need for new standards and better metrics to assess the benefits of health financing reforms. Assessments need to be survey based, and causality must be established through the use of experimental or quasi-experimental designs.
This paper uses household survey data and a quasiexperimental design to examine the case of Rwanda, which has successfully implemented policies to reduce financial barriers to health care on a national scale. Some key lessons can be drawn from the analysis of this experience in terms of both implementation and evaluation.
Context
Rwanda has made a remarkable transition from reconstruction to development since the 1994 genocide that killed a fifth of its population. In recent years, Rwanda has rebuilt its health sector and made dramatic progress on MDG-related health indicators, implementing a variety of reforms aimed at improving health service delivery and access to care, particularly for the most vulnerable segments of the population. Starting in 1996, Rwanda has introduced community financing and management of frontline health facilities, and championed major fiscal and health financing reforms. Rwanda's reforms include an innovative health system and financing model grounded in grassroots initiatives and institutions. Three prominent reforms in the field of health financing were employed to boost both the demand for, and the supply of, health services: health micro-insurance ('mutuelles'), performance-based financing (PBF) and fiscal decentralization. All these reforms were implemented within an administrative culture of command and control, with strong leadership of the Government of Rwanda.
Since 2000, health insurance has been progressively scaled-up at the national level through community-based health insurance schemes with strong support from the Government of Rwanda (see Box 1). PBF was initiated as a pilot in 2002 and scaled-up nationally in 2006. In 2007, PBF transferred public funds-about US$1.8 per capita-from the Treasury directly to health facilities at the basic health service level on the basis of a performance-based formula that included 22 key indicators. These funds are flexible and may be used for facility expenditures, including performance-linked salary bonuses, partially substituting for revenues from user fees.
Finally in 2007, Rwanda undertook a political and fiscal decentralization reform that fully decentralized the health delivery system. Both public and faith-based health facilities are now legal, autonomous entities, responsible for the management of financial resources, health service delivery and human resources for health. As of 2007, the President of the Republic formally signed multi-sectoral performance contracts (IMIHIGOs) with his district mayors. For the health sector, the performance indicators included: (a) the number of people adhering to health insurance; (b) the number of institutional deliveries; (c) the number of women using family planning methods; and (d) the use of insecticide-treated bed nets. District transfers for health are commanding an increasing share of government health expenditures as a result of fiscal decentralization reforms. Since the 2005 fiscal decentralization process, funds being transferred to districts have been increasing: transfers have increased from Rwandan Francs (RwF) 1.3 billion in 2005, to RwF 7.1 billion in 2006 and RwF 9.7 billion in 2007 (Sayinzoga et al. 2010) . Rwanda also benefits from a high level of foreign aid. In 2005, donor per capita expenditures were estimated at US$15 out of a total of US$34, about half of which came through earmarked financing for HIV/AIDS (World Bank and MOH Rwanda 2010) and the other half through budget support.
Methods
This article examines how the innovative health care financing policies promoted by Rwanda have affected financial access for the poor, increased utilization of health services and reduced out-of-pocket payments for health care. The paper then examines the impact of the scaling-up of health insurance on service utilization and out-of-pocket expenditures to show the effect of Rwanda's implementation of one particular policy on financial barriers to access for the poor.
This analysis examines both utilization of services and household expenditures on health in Rwanda to answer three main questions:
What has been the evolution of utilization of health services in Rwanda over time, particularly among the poor and for interventions with high impact on the MDGs? What has been the evolution of financial protection against payments in public facilities, household health expenditures and catastrophic expenditures? What has been the role of micro-insurance ('mutuelles') in contributing to these results? This analysis employs a comprehensive set of measures to answer these questions using longitudinal nationwide population-based survey data over a period of 5-7 years. Management 2006) . To compare trends for direct illness-related spending between the EICV 2000 and EICV 2005, median direct illness-related spending among individuals with non-zero expenditures has been adjusted for inflation, using the consumer price index. The data were analysed using STATA 11.
In order to draw inferences on the effect of health financing policies on household behaviours, the paper relies on the 
Results

Evolution of utilization of health services
Between 2000 and 2007, utilization of almost all health services increased in Rwanda. The total number of OPD visits at health centres (both public and faith-based) increased from 2.8 million in 2002, to 5.9 million in 2006, reaching 6.7 million in 2007. Population-based measurements confirm the steady increase in utilization of health services, particularly among poorest groups (Table 1) . Between 2000 and 2005, the overall rate of utilization of modern health services by individuals in the general population who reported that they had been ill during the 2 weeks preceding the interview increased by more than 50% from 17.5% to 26.9%, with 16% using public health services and 11% using private health services. Utilization of services increased even more among the poorest quintile, from 10.7% to 17.4%.
The largest levels of increase occurred for high impact, MDGrelated interventions. The use of insecticide-treated bed nets by children under 5 years increased from 6% to 58% of the population between 2000 and 2007. Assisted birth deliveries increased from 27% to 52%, with the poorest group experiencing the largest increase from 12.1% to 42.7%. Most remarkably, family planning intake increased from 3.4% to 27.4% during this period, a result never previously observed elsewhere (May and Kamurase 2009) . Utilization of preventive care such as antenatal care (ANC) and immunization also increased
Box 1 Health insurance in Rwanda
In 2000, the first health insurance scheme, RAMA (Rwandaise d'Assurance Maladie), was established for civil servants and the formal sector. Health 'mutuelles' (micro-insurance) covering rural communities and the informal sector were concomitantly expanded in order to promote equitable access to quality health services. These 'mutuelles' reflect a bottom-up strategy, driven largely by local communities, and motivated by the success of the initial pilot schemes, which the central government subsequently decided to scale up. The central government currently sets national guidelines and policies, including benefit packages and contribution policies. In 2008, the government instituted district and national guarantee funds to subsidize the extension of the benefit packages of health mutuelles. The government also relied on the national network of health mutuelles to design and implement demand-based, targeted subsidies through which the government, donors and nongovernment organizations provide health insurance coverage to indigents, vulnerable groups and people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWAIDS). At the operational level, however, health mutuelles are operated and organized by community representatives and local health care providers. They also serve as a forum to promote dialogue between the community and providers on the quality and range of health services offered. The scheme is voluntary. A law making the scheme compulsory was voted on in March 2008. However, the application decrees have not yet been published. As a consequence, the scheme was still not legally compulsory in 2010. A study conducted in 2008 by the Ministry of Health reports a level of administrative costs amounting to between 10-15% of revenues collected (MOH Rwanda 2008) . This includes the costs associated with the roles played by mutuelles schemes in the management of the coverage of indigents, PLWAIDS and other vulnerable groups. The mutuelles pay fees for services to clinics and health centres. Membership in micro-insurance health mutuelles has grown consistently since 2000. In 2003, the number of health mutuelle beneficiaries reached over half a million people, i.e. 7% of the target population. By 2005, that number had climbed to 3.7 million, or 44% of the target population.
a In 2006, the government started subsidizing part of the premium of the poorest quarter of the population, succeeding in channelling Global Fund money into the insurance mechanisms. It thereby intelligently bypassed a trade-off between extension of coverage and maximizing revenues for the health system (Soors et al. 2011) . Following the implementation of the policy of public subsidy of indigents and district risk pools, enrolment in mutuelles reached 85% of the population in 2008, bringing Rwanda to universal coverage status, with 91% of its population having health insurance. (Figure 1 ). Traditional healers, who were the leading source of health care in 2000 when they accounted for 11% of consultations, were the least consulted in 2005, at 7%. This increase in utilization by children under 5 has taken place for all socio-economic groups. Among children from the poorest quintile, the rate of utilization of modern services in the case of fever and cough more than doubled from 7% to 18% (Figure 2 ). (Table 3) . Generally, households that live very close to health centres spend more than those living far away.
Household expenditures
The role of micro-insurance ('mutuelles')
Analysis of the EICV 2005 data indicates that micro-insurance has probably played an important role in stimulating utilization. The utilization of modern services by the insured population is nearly twice as high as the use by the uninsured in 2005, and twice as high as that among the general population in 2000, a time when health insurance coverage was close to zero ( Figure 4 ). In 2005, among individuals indicating that they had been ill during the 2 weeks preceding the survey, 52% of those who were members of the Rwandaise d'Assurance Maladie (RAMA) social insurance, and 34% of those who were members of a health micro-insurance ('mutuelle'), utilized modern health services, while only 21% of those with no health insurance coverage did. Those with no insurance coverage showed a greater tendency to utilize the services of traditional practitioners, in contrast to individuals with health insurance coverage ( Figure 5 ). The positive effect of health insurance on utilization is confirmed by analysis of the data of DHS 2005 conducted on a different sample. Table 4 provides a summary of the results of the logistic regression analysis of factors associated with the probability of utilizing modern health services for children under 5 who have had a fever or cough during the 2 weeks preceding the interview. Children whose mothers had health insurance coverage, either through RAMA or through a health 'mutuelle', were twice as likely to be treated by modern health services in the event of a fever or cough compared with children whose mothers had no health insurance coverage. Table 5 presents similar results of the logistic regression analysis of factors associated with the probability of giving birth at a modern facility, for births occurring in 2004 and 2005. 1 Women from the two poorest quintiles were four times less likely to deliver at a modern facility, compared with women from the richest quintile. Women with coverage from a health 'mutuelle' were 1.6 times as likely to deliver at a modern facility in comparison with women without health insurance coverage. Under the regression model adjusted for health-seeking behaviour among sick children, health insurance coverage status is treated as an exogenous variable. As enrolment in micro health insurance schemes in Rwanda is a household decision taken on a yearly basis, it is assumed that health insurance coverage status is a predetermined variable that is exogenous to the decision process to seek care when the random event of a child falling sick occurs during the year. Number of illness episodes among children of insured and non-insured households is indeed similar.
The disaggregated analysis of household expenditures between insured and non-insured populations in 2005 also suggests a positive effect of health insurance. The median direct Figure 6 ). The reduction in the level of direct illness-related spending among individuals with mutual health insurance coverage compared with individuals with no health insurance coverage occurred for most categories of health-related expenditures (Table 3) . Direct spending associated with consultations was 2.7 times higher (RwF 591) among the non-insured individuals compared with individuals insured through mutual health insurance schemes (RwF 218). The differences are even greater for drug expenditures, which generally constitute the largest direct health expenditure item for households: direct spending associated with drugs was three times higher among the non-insured individuals than among individuals insured through mutual health insurance schemes. They were also larger for hospitalization expenditures, which are mostly concentrated and are one of the major sources of catastrophic health-related expenditures: direct spending associated with hospitalization was 3.5 times higher among the non-insured individuals than among individuals insured through mutual health insurance schemes.
A similar pattern is observed for all income quintiles, between individuals residing in urban and rural areas, and in different provinces, as well as between individuals residing at different distances from health facilities, suggesting a persistent positive effect of health insurance (Table 3) .
Finally, mutual health insurance coverage appears to provide protection against catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures. Among the non-insured in 2005, 10.5% of households experienced out-of-pocket health expenditures higher than 20% of capacity to pay, 2 while the incidence of catastrophic expenditures was only 4% among the insured (Table 6 ). The same results are observed at the more extreme cut-off point of 40% of capacity to pay. In that case, 4.1% of households experienced catastrophic expenditures among the non-insured compared with 1.1% among the insured. While differences in the incidence of catastrophic expenditures are observed between the poorest 20% and the richest 20% among the non-insured, these disappear among the insured. 
Discussion
We find strong evidence from different sequential populationbased surveys that the health care financing policies implemented by Rwanda between 2000 and 2007 generated positive outcomes, particularly for the poor. With rapidly declining child mortality, Rwanda has now established itself as one of the strongest performers on health in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Utilization of services has increased in Rwanda, particularly among the poorest groups. Increased utilization has, in all likelihood, contributed to the acceleration of progress made towards reaching the health-related MDGs, as the utilization of interventions with high impact on maternal and child mortality-such as assisted deliveries, contraceptive prevalence, use of insecticide-treated bed nets and treatment of pneumonia-has increased. We also have evidence that the package of policies has led to reduced health expenditures for households, as well as a reduction in the incidence of catastrophic expenditures on health.
Drawing a causal link between the Government of Rwanda's specific policies and these achievements is no easy task. Many factors are likely to have contributed. Thanks to the government's appetite for rigorous evaluation of the impact of its policies, we have fairly strong evidence that two out of the three main health financing policies championed by Rwanda-micro-insurance and PBF-have contributed significantly to reducing financial barriers to health care, and to increasing the level of resources allocated to basic health services.
Our analysis in this paper shows that enrolment in the national micro-insurance system ('mutuelles') is most likely a significant factor contributing to higher utilization of services and income protection, including among the poor. For the overall population in 2005, health insurance coverage increased to more than 40% of the population and out-of-pocket spending declined among the insured. The effect of 'mutuelles' on use of modern health providers was also strong among the poorest quintiles. Health 'mutuelles' also succeeded in protecting against catastrophic illness-related expenditure. Evidence on the impact of 'mutuelles' will have to be confirmed at the current much higher level of coverage reached in Rwanda today. This analysis, however, indicates that the scaling up of micro-insurance has had a pro-poor effect by increasing utilization among the poor as well as by increasing income protection. This effect occurred before the re-insurance pools were set up at district and national level. We also know from another study (Basinga et al. 2010 ) that PBF has had an independent effect on increasing utilization and on improving quality of health services between 2008. Basinga et al.' s carefully controlled study shows that results-based contracts in Rwanda have contributed significantly to the increase in assisted birth deliveries as well as in the uptake of child health services, but they have also increased the quality of services as measured by structural indicators and vignettes. Clinics that received PBF performed more assisted deliveries and provided better infant care than clinics receiving the same funding without a performance contract. Quality of care of antenatal services was 15% higher in PBF clinics than in control clinics. The analysis also confirms that PBF was not the only determinant of success as the increase in uptake of other health interventions, including family planning, was similar in both the PBF and the control group.
Other factors likely played a role in the success of Rwanda although they cannot be rigorously assessed due to a lack of quasi-experimental data. As in any reconstruction period after a crisis affecting the majority of the population, it is to be expected that economic and social indicators, including health indicators, improve. Rwanda's indicators have, however, improved more and faster than those in neighbouring countries, and have done so in a pro-poor manner. Another critical factor is certainly the increase in resources, particularly from donors. Fiscal decentralization also brought more resources to the frontline of service delivery.
Political will expressed in the 'IMIHIGO' contract is also an important factor as the President of the country exerts strong leadership in demanding accountability, transparency and results. This factor is likely essential in a context where a strong command and control of public ethos prevails. Leadership has also been exerted by authorities of the Ministry of Health at both central and local levels, local administrative authorities of districts, sectors and cells, and other community leaders. Anecdotes report, for example, that mayors organized impromptu nightly visits to households to check whether citizens slept under insecticide-treated nets, sometimes fining those that did not. Together Rwanda's financing policies have been effective in reducing the level of payments at the point of delivery in publicly funded clinics. Government policies on fees were flexible and sensible, seeking effective reductions in payments, and not merely political posturing as sometimes observed in other countries. Free provision of public and merit goods, such as family planning, immunization and bed nets, was strongly enforced, leading to a dramatic increase in their utilization. But for most other interventions, decisions of price reductions at the point of service were made by the facilities and off-set by payments from 'mutuelles' and PBF. Anecdotal evidence suggests that to increase their rates of assisted deliveries, and thus benefit from the PBF payments, providers reduced their prices and even instituted negative 'fees' or cash transfers in the form of gifts offered to pregnant women. 'Mutuelles' also pressured down the price paid by users who only had to contribute modest copayments.
Better performance of health services results from a complex set of institutional and financial arrangements and requires long-term follow-up. Nonetheless some key lessons can be learned from the analysis of the Rwanda experience. First, the analysis of health financing policies should be conducted in a broad context, and include a comprehensive analysis of the progress in achieving equity of health services. The analysis of impact of health financing policies must be based on an assessment of a comprehensive set of indicators. Impact on utilization and on income protection ought to be examined as well as quality of care. Measures of utilization should be disaggregated by curative and preventive care and by vulnerable groups, including women, children under 5 and the poor (Box 2). Second, as country systems are increasingly pluralistic and the private sector plays a large role in service provision, the use of routine public services data should be avoided. Assessments need to be survey based. Standardizing the analysis and benchmarking the various measurements would allow relevant intraand inter-country comparisons to be conducted, as well as better understanding of reform dynamics over time. Third, causality should ideally be established through the use of experimental or quasi-experimental designs. Improving the evidence base for policymaking in developing countries will require both survey-based series and a good knowledge of policy packages. Policy impact evaluation should be a priority area for support from governments, donors and academic institutions.
Conclusion
Rwanda has chosen to develop a mixed health care financing model, combining decentralization and performance-based financing with a strategy to pool private spending through the building of grassroots, community-based micro-insurance. This paper shows that the unusual route chosen by Rwanda yields promising results which could be emulated by other lowincome countries in search of models to reduce financial barriers to health care. Other approaches may also work, but what is important is to increase access for the poor and reduce payments at the point of use. As Deng Xiaoping said: 'It doesn't matter if the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice. ' A key issue for the future is sustainability and the necessary evolution of the institutional support for the health financing approach of Rwanda. As per many sub-Saharan African countries, Rwanda is highly aid dependent and will remain so for the next decade. This calls for sustained efforts from the donor community to the health system strengthening agenda. 'Mutuelles' certainly provide a way towards more sustained domestic funding and are an efficient way to pool private out-of-pocket spending. But there is a need for the government-with the help of donors-to subsidize the enrolment of the poorest and to ensure the regulation of the package benefits as well as the provider payments mechanisms in order to ensure equitable access to quality services.
Finally, a particularly important lesson learned from the Rwanda experience is the integration of strong mechanisms to evaluate the impact of its policies. The experience of Rwanda, as well as that of other low-income countries, in introducing pro-poor financing policies needs to be systematically evaluated using rigorous metrics and standardized benchmarks. It is possible for countries to nest impact evaluation designs when introducing new policies at scale. The donor community needs to support these evaluations if they want to improve aid effectiveness.
